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INTRODUCTION
It may be blasphemous to complain about Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins.1 The 1989 term of the United States Supreme Court
was widely regarded as having been a disastrous term for propo-
nents of civil rights, sexual equality, and progressive causes. In
1989, then, Ann Hopkins' victory was notable. She convinced the
Court that employers-not employees-should bear the burden of
persuasion in what are known as "mixed motivation" cases.2 These
are cases in which employment decisions are purportedly made for
both sexist and nonsexist reasons. Hopkins stands for the proposi-
tion that, even in the professional world, there are limits to part-
ners' discretion when they choose who will join their ranks. After
Hopkins, plaintiffs' attorneys will try hard to characterize their
cases as mixed motivation cases to take advantage of the burden
shifting, particularly now that the theory of disparate impact has
been eroded by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.3
My critique of Hopkins is not that the Court reached the
wrong result. Rather, I take issue more generally with the compar-
ative approach used in Title VII sex discrimination cases-an ap-
proach by which the courts seek to discover whether discrimina-
tory conduct caused harm to a woman by imagining if the same
fate would have happened to a man. Even the plurality and con-
curring opinions in Hopkins continue an unproductive search for
illicit motivation and causation. Hopkins further complicates the
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1. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
2. For doctrinal discussions of mixed motivation cases, see Brodin, The Standard of
Causation in the Mixed Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 292 (1982); Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme
Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VII, 6 INDuS. REL.
L.J. 353 (1984); Zimmer & Sullivan, The Structure of Title VII Individual Disparate
Treatment Litigation: Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, Inferences of Discrimination and
Burdens of Proof, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 43-51 (1986).
3. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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law of employment discrimination by refining evidentiary burdens
in a special category of cases. In this process the more critical facts
and issues surrounding the treatment of women in the workplace
are submerged and left unexamined. For instance, there is little in
the opinions in the Hopkins litigation about the specific barriers
women face when they break into and try to advance within male-
dominated professions." There is not much about the mechanisms
that are used to contain the rise of women in hierarchies that in-
volve significant sources of wealth and power. If a woman wanted
to learn how to make it in one of the "Big 8" accounting firms, I do
not think she would gain much useful information from the Court's
discussion of discrimination. Instead, the opinions embrace the
rhetoric of similar, highly abstract debates over intent and causa-
tion that permeate tort law,5 constitutional law,6 and labor law.7
One unusual feature of the Hopkins litigation, however, which
deserves attention is the role played by Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert
witness for the plaintiff. Fiske testified at trial that sexual stere-
otyping played a major determining role in the firm's decision not
to make Hopkins a partner. Fiske's testimony drew on a body of
research in social psychology which explains stereotyping as a
function of the structural features of an organization and which
catalogues the forms of expression such stereotyping often takes.
In contrast to the time-worn metaphysical debate about causation
that so engaged the Supreme Court Justices, Fiske's analysis of
what was going on at Price Waterhouse was concrete and poten-
tially quite useful for reshaping Title VII doctrine. Fiske's orienta-
tion was far from radical; her opinions were located squarely
within the mainstream of her discipline and endorsed by the
American Psychological Assocation. s I got the impression, however,
that not many of the judges who ruled at the various stages of the
Hopkins litigation were persuaded by what Fiske was saying.
Judge Williams of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
4. Justice O'Connor did remark, however, that cases like Hopkins might not be excep-
tional. She cited the "growing number" of similar cases in the lower courts and the "mount-
ing evidence" that intentional discrimination was very hard to prove. Price Waterhouse, 109
S. Ct. at 1802. By declining to treat Hopkins' claim as exceptional, O'Connor implicitly
acknowledged that barriers faced by women in the workplace were pervasive and real.
5. See, e.g., H. HART & T. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Transportation Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
8. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respon-
dent at 4-5, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) [hereinafter APA Amicus
Brief].
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was openly hostile to Fiske's message,9 and Supreme Court Justice
Kennedy echoed Williams' disparaging remarks.'0 Judge Ge-
sell-the trial judge in the case who ruled for Hopkins-at times
seemed very skeptical of Fiske's analysis and conclusions." Even
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality in favor of Hopkins,"
was careful to point out that he was not relying too heavily on
Fiske. He was tempted to call her testimony "icing on the cake.'
13
Perhaps part of the resistance to Fiske's testimony stemmed
from a judicial reluctance to let a social scientist determine what
constitutes discrimination. When I first read the trial court's
description of Fiske's testimony, I admit that it did seem somehow
inappropriate to allow a nonlegal expert to testify on what ap-
peared to be the ultimate legal issue in the case. Beyond this gen-
eral distrust for nonlegal knowledge, however, what might have
made Fiske's testimony appear inapposite to the courtroom setting
was that the research that informed Fiske's opinions had radical
potential. Fiske did not fit in well because, in her view, sex dis-
crimination was not a rare occurrence directly traceable to the bad
intent of a few individuals. Fiske's starting point was that sex dis-
crimination is the not-so-rare byproduct of an organizational struc-
ture which lacks a high percentage of women in powerful positions.
Fiske's feminist orientation may have posed too great a challenge
for male-dominated Title VII litigation. Her knowledge of stere-
otyping problematized the legal assumption that intent and cause
are objective facts which can be "found" in individual cases.
Fiske's testimony explained how gender could shape perceptions of
a woman's "personality" and "style" so as to cast doubt on even
sincere assessments by those who sit in judgment in male-domi-
nated institutions.
In the course of the litigation, Fiske was disparaged, dismissed
as irrelevant, and accused of lacking professional integrity. This in-
tense negative reaction to Fiske indicates that something more
than the ordinary distrust of nonlegal experts was operating in this
9. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J.
dissenting), rev'd and remanded, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
10. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1813 n.5 (1989) (Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
11. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded,
109 S. Ct. 1175 (1989). See infra text accompanying notes 110-44.
12. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
13. Id. at 1793.
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case-much of the criticism of Fiske was itself sexist.
My commentary is directed more at the tone and rhetoric of
the arguments and discussion in the lower courts than it is with
the holding and legal theory of the Supreme Court's decision. Ann
Hopkins deserved to win and she did win. In my opinion, Dr. Su-
san Fiske presented the best reasons why Ann Hopkins should win.
I think the law could benefit from spending more time on the work
of Fiske and her colleagues. If we listened to Dr. Fiske, we might
reshape the legal notion of sex discrimination in a way that helps
women and turns Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins into the easy case
it should be.
I. THE RECORD ON ANN HOPKINS
One of the reasons why the Ann Hopkins case received so
much attention may have been thatthe facts seemed more clear-
cut than many controversies presented to the Supreme Court.
From a liberal feminist framework, the case is a textbook example
of the dangers of sex-based discrimination faced by professional
women. Hopkins was denied access to the highest level of the firm,
even though she consistently outperformed men by male-focused
standards. She asserted that she was caught in a familiar double
bind.14 Although her job required unfeminine behavior (e.g., gener-
ating business, giving orders, and being assertive), Hopkins' oppo-
nents criticized her and voted against her because she was
unfeminine.
When she was denied partnership at Price Waterhouse, Ann
Hopkins was a senior manager in her fourth year with the firm. As
to the most important measures, she appeared to be a very good
prospect-she brought in more business than any other person
nominated for partner that year, and she billed the most hours.
She was credited with winning a sizeable contract with the Depart-
ment of State that Price Waterhouse admitted was a "leading cre-
dential" for the firm when it competed for other lucrative govern-
14. In the Hopkins litigation, the double bind manifested itself in the gendered expec-
tation that women should not be aggressive even though aggressiveness was one of the desir-
able job qualifications. See id. at 1791. Feminist theorists have identified double binds fac-
ing women in a variety of other contexts. See, e.g., Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1915-17 (1987) (discussing double bind of commodification versus non-corn-
modification of women's abilities).
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ment contracts. 15 The partners in her division initially strongly
supported her candidacy. She was well regarded by her clients. 16
This impressive record was made even more visible by the rar-
ity of women at the high levels of Price Waterhouse. When Hop-
kins became a candidate for partner in 1984, only 7 of the 662
partners at the firm were women. Hopkins was also the only wo-
man in the group of 88 persons being considered for partnership
her year.'
7
Hopkins was turned down for partnership because several
partners objected to her personality. Her deficiency was said to be
her lack of "interpersonal skills."' 8 Specifically, opponents disap-
proved of her managerial style and her treatment of staff.'9
The process leading to partnership required partners who had
contact with Hopkins to fill out a form-a long form for partners
with extensive contact and a short form for those with less expo-
sure to the candidate. Only 32 of the firm's partners submitted
written comments. Of these, 8 partners opposed her and 3 recom-
mended that her candidacy be put on hold. That degree of opposi-
tion, however, was enough to put Hopkins on hold. The Price
Waterhouse system was "collegial" in that there were no pre-set
standards for determining what degree of opposition would be fatal
to a candidacy. Ultimately, however, 62 of the 88 candidates re-
ceived partnership offers.2"
The crux of Hopkins' case centered on the gender-based na-
ture of the written comments submitted by the partners-both her
opponents and her supporters-and on the oral advise given to
Hopkins by the head partner in her division. The governing body
of the firm (the Policy Board) voted to defer Hopkins' candidacy
because she lacked "social grace."'" This concept of social grace
was given an explicitly gendered dimension in some of the written
comments. One partner said that she needed to take a course in
15. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and re-
manded, 109 S. Ct. at 1775 (1989).
16. Price Waterhouse, 109 S. Ct. at 1782.
17. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
18. Id. at 1113.
19. Id.
20. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and re-
manded, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
21. Id. at 463.
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charm school.22 Others criticized her for not fitting the traditional
feminine image; they claimed that she was "overly aggressive, '"23
"macho, 24 and that she "overcompensated for being a woman."'25
Other partners pointed to her use of profanity.2" One of her sup-
porters stated that he believed that the negative reaction to her
language stemmed from the fact that Hopkins was "a lady using
foul language. '"27
The conventional wisdom at the firm seemed to be that unless
Hopkins softened her style, she would not make partner. The most
celebrated comment in the record came from the partner in charge
of Hopkins' office who counseled her to "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry."2 8 Hopkins was advised to un-
dertake a quality control review. But before the results of that re-
view were in, she lost the crucial support of two partners in her
home office. She left Price Waterhouse, set up her own firm, and
sued.2"
Additional evidence of sexual stereotyping at Price
Waterhouse was introduced at trial. In prior years, one woman
candidate for partner had been criticized for trying to be too much
like "one of the boys"; 0 another, because she reminded a male
partner of Ma Barker;"' and another, because she was typecast as a
"women's lib[b]er."32 The starkest evidence of sexism was a com-
ment made by a partner the year before Hopkins' evaluation who
said that he "could not consider any woman seriously as a partner-
22. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
23. Id. at 1113.
24. Id. at 1117.
25. Id. at 1116-17.
26: Id. at 1117.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1113.
30. Id. at 1117. The comment was supposedly meant as criticism of the candidate for
spending too much time with nonprofessional office staff who were predominantly women.
For this reason, Judge Williams regarded the comment as sex-neutral. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). Williams did not
appreciate the structural situation of a token professional woman who finds that to socialize
with other women, she must often cross class lines-lines that are also gender lines. To be
criticized for being too much like one of the girls (the import of the comment made) is thus
not sex-neutral because it makes women disproportionately vulnerable for seeking out each
other's company.
31. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
32. Id.
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ship candidate and believed that women were not even capable of
functioning as senior managers.""3 The partner was never repri-
manded and his vote was recorded.
Some specific incidents in support of Price Waterhouse's as-
sertion that Hopkins' personal style was overbearing also came out
during the trial. She once yelled obscenities at a consultant for
forty-five minutes.34 She interrupted another woman manager and
told her to keep still during a meeting.3 5
As I read the litigation documents, the most critical facts in
the case were not in serious dispute. Ann Hopkins was a "token" in
the sense that, at Price Waterhouse, she was one of a tiny propor-
tion of partners or persons in line for partnership who were
women. Ann Hopkins' record was superb on all objective perform-
ance measures. No one seemed to dispute her professional compe-
tency or that she was exceptionally good at generating business.
There was no question that her clients were satisfied with her per-
formance. The only roadblock to partnership was the subjective as-
sessment of some partners that Hopkins' personal style was unac-
ceptable. The critical legal issue was whether that judgment was
sexually discriminatory.
II. THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DR. SUSAN FISKE
Hopkins attempted to prove that the objections to her person-
ality were sexually discriminatory by introducing the expert testi-
mony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist. Fiske's specialty is
sex stereotyping in organizations.3 6 She prepared for trial by read-
ing written documents pertaining to the Hopkins candidacy and
written comments made in conjunction with several other male
33. Id.
34. Brief for the Petitioner at 7-8, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989)
[hereinafter Brief for the Petitioner].
35. Trial Testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, Record at 71, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) [hereinafter Trial Testimony].
36. At the time of trial, Fiske was an Associate Professor of Psychology. at Carnegie
Mellon University. She received her undergraduate degree and her Ph.D from Harvard Uni-
versity. In the field of stereotyping, Fiske had published several articles and was the recipi-
ent of a National Science Foundation Grant to study people's evaluative and emotional re-
sponses to stereotypes. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 21-23. Currently, Fiske is
Professor of Psychology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. She gives an ac-
count of Price Waterhouse in Court's Ruling Against Sex Stereotyping in Employment
Decisions Will Make It Easier for Professors to Win Discrimination Lawsuits, CHRONICLE
OF HIGHER EDUCATION, May 31, 1989, at B1-B3.
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and female candidates for partnership at Price Waterhouse. Her
analysis was based on the written record, supplemented by infor-
mation on the firm's demographics, partnership criteria, and selec-
tive data on other partnership candidates.
Fiske stated that sexual stereotyping "played a major deter-
mining role" in the decision to deny Hopkins a partnership. 8 Her
analysis placed great weight on the structural features and selec-
tion process at Price Waterhouse as well as on the nature of the
comments about Hopkins. Because Fiske had never interviewed
anyone at Price Waterhouse, including Ann Hopkins, she did not
testify as to any particular individual's state of mind. Instead she
pinpointed those factors (or antecedent conditions) that might
have encouraged stereotyping at Price Waterhouse and identified
what she regarded as a pattern of comments indicating that stere-
otyping was present.
Of paramount importance to Fiske was the fact that Hopkins
was a token woman at the firm. Fiske explained the social science
research on the importance of "rarity" in social organizations. 9
The research she relied most heavily upon was that done by
Rosabeth Moss Kanter.4 0 Kanter's most well-known book, Men
and Women of the Corporation, is an ethnography of a large cor-
poration. In it, Kanter articulates many ways in which "discrimi-
nation itself emerges as a consequence of organizational pressures
as much as individual prejudice. 41 Kanter's work demonstrates
that when a group is very rare-constituting approximately 15% or
less of the organization-the members of the group are unable to
form alliances and have little prospect of influencing the dominant
culture.4 2 Citing Kanter and others, Fiske testified that the condi-
tion of rarity can have a significant impact on how a person is
viewed within the organization.4 3 Fiske stated that when there is
dramatic underrepresentation of a group, the token individuals are
much more likely to be thought about in terms of their social cate-
gory. People expect token individuals to fit preconceived views
about the traits of the group, to manifest particular qualities. To-
37. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 44-45.
38. Id. at 28.
39. Id. at 26.
40. Id. at 25, 31. Fiske also mentioned the work of Professors Madeline Heilman of
N.Y.U. and Shelley Taylor of U.C.L.A.
41. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 9 (1977).
42. Id. at 208-09.
43. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 26-27.
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kens are highly visible as people who are different, and they are
not often permitted the individuality of their unique, nonstere-
otypical characteristics. When a token person behaves in a way
that is counterstereotypical-for example, when a woman acts in
an aggressive, competitive, ambitious, independent, or active
way-she is more likely to be regarded as uncaring or lacking in
understanding." This does not mean that women can play safe by
conforming to conventional stereotypes. The Catch 22 or double
bind of the powerless group is that stereotypes associated with
nondominant groups are also traits that are not highly valued in
the organization. A woman who acts womanly acts in a way that
may cast doubt on her competence and effectiveness; a woman who
is thought to be too masculine may be regarded as deviant.' 5
In describing how persons respond to an individual whose be-
havior is incongruent with prevailing stereotypes, Fiske referred to
Kanter's four "role traps.""' Under this scheme, the dominant
male group perceives token women as mothers, seductresses, iron
maidens, or pets.' 7 These perceptions and the roles associated with
them constrict the group's image of the woman and allow the men
in the group to treat the woman in a "packaged" way.' 8 The role
trap most applicable to Hopkins is that of the "iron maiden."
Kanter's research describes the iron maiden as the contemporary
version of the virgin aunt.4 9 Women who refuse to play roles more
congruent with feminine stereotypes (e.g., mother, seductress, or
pet) may find themselves viewed as "hard, unemotional, difficult to
get along with," and "[n]ot a regular human being." 50 An iron
maiden is considered tougher or more dangerous than she is. As a
result, she might be "trapped into a more militant stance than...
[she] might otherwise take."'51 When a woman is typecast as an
iron maiden, there is a tendency to characterize "mixed" behavior
(tough and assertive, yet warm and funny) as being only tough and
assertive, thus suppressing the interpretation that does not fit the
stereotype.2
44. Id. at 31.
45. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 16.
46. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 31.
47. R. KANTER, supra note 41, at 233.
48. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 22.
49. R. KANTER, supra note 41, at 233.
50. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 31.
51. R. KANTER, supra note 41, at 236.
52. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 24.
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Fiske's account of the gendered way token women in an organ-
ization are likely to be perceived was used by Hopkins to discredit
the "neutrality" of the partners' observations of Hopkins' interper-
sonal skills. Under Fiske's theory, the explicitly sex-based com-
ments describing Hopkins were a predictable response to her sta-
tus as a token woman who did not fit the conventional feminine
mold. Fiske gave Hopkins a theory to explain why some partners
might react so negatively to her unfeminine behavior-why devia-
tion from expected sex-linked behavior would be viewed as a per-
sonal shortcoming and result in a penalty. Fiske's analysis opened
the possibility that a double standard might be operating at Price
Waterhouse in which women accountants were expected to behave
in a way suitable for women while still satisfying male performance
standards.
More importantly, Fiske's analysis cast doubt on some of the
comments critical of Hopkins' personality that were expressed in a
more sex-neutral fashion. Fiske noted that, under conditions of
rarity, evaluators may give biased attention to stereotypic dimen-
sions. 3 This means that women will be scrutinized more closely
than men on "feminine" dimensions such as social skills and per-
sonality, and that attention will be focused away from "masculine"
task or performance measures. This kind of biased attention can
be very harmful to a woman who acts counter to the stereotype.
Kanter describes how tokens "capture a larger awareness share.""4
A token woman's "shortcomings" then become highly visible, in
addition to being shaped in a gender-coded fashion.
An additional cue Fiske found which indicated that stereotyp-
ing was influencing decisionmaking was the intensity of the nega-
tive reaction toward Hopkins. 5 Opponents tended to exaggerate
the negative and discount the positive. Claims were made, for ex-
ample, that Hopkins was universally disliked, potentially danger-
ous, and likely to abuse authority.56 Fiske contrasted these ex-
tremely negative comments with positive comments by others in
the organization who seemed to describe the same behavior. Sup-
porters found Hopkins as "outspoken, sells her own ability, inde-
pendent, [has] courage of her convictions."57 Detractors found her
53. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 37.
54. R. KANTER, supra note 41, at 210.
55. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 39.
56. Id. at 39, 55.
57. Id. at 37.
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"overbearing, arrogant, abrasive, runs over people, implies she
knows more than anyone in the world about anything and is not
afraid to let anybody know it."58 Fiske's testimony on this phe-
nomenon of "selective perception" suggested that the differing re-
actions to Hopkins were not simply a function of the slice of Hop-
kins' behavior that each individual evaluator had witnessed.
Instead, when all the evidence was in, the "real" Ann Hopkins
might still not clearly emerge from putting all the pieces together.
For Fiske, the reality of Ann Hopkins was actually shaped by her
status as a token and the degree to which the organizational cli-
mate encouraged or discouraged reliance on stereotypes. Although
Fiske's approach was far from postmodern, it did challenge the no-
tion that the court could easily discover the objective truth about
Ann Hopkins' personality. The process of truth-finding was com-
plicated by Fiske's emphasis on the importance of the structural
position of the subjects (the evaluating partners) and the object of
their judgment (Ann Hopkins). Fiske's use of Kanter's role traps
also demonstrated how other people can contribute to the social
construction of the personality of an individual. This made it more
difficult to separate Hopkins' "real" personality from the environ-
ment in which she worked.
In addition to delineating some of the ways stereotyping might
find expression when a token person is evaluated, Fiske criticized
the specific partnership process at Price Waterhouse. 9 Stereotyp-
ing was encouraged in Fiske's view because Price Waterhouse did
not clearly specify the criteria on which partners were to base their
judgments of a candidate's personal qualities. Decisive weight was
placed on negative assessments of partners who had very limited
contact with Hopkins, allowing sex-linked judgments to drive the
process.
Fiske used a qualitative, ethonographic methodology to arrive
at her conclusion that stereotyping played a major determining
role in the firm's decision to deny Hopkins a partnership. Her tes-
timony was unusual in employment discrimination litigation in
that she was not analyzing the results of past employment deci-
sions at Price Waterhouse and trying to show a statistical sex
bias." Nor was she reporting on the results of a survey or an inter-
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id. at 32-33.
60. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's ambivalent attitude toward social psychol-
ogists and social science data, see Bersoff, Psychologists and the Judicial System, 10 LAw
19901
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view she had conducted at Price Waterhouse. Instead, her method
was to demonstrate those patterns of behavior at Price Waterhouse
which strongly resembled behavioral patterns identified in
Kanter's research as characteristic ways in which organizations re-
spond to the "problem" of token women. In Fiske's analysis, stere-
otyping was a byproduct of organizational demographics, not sim-
ply the insensitivity of individuals holding stereotyped views. A
crucial part of Fiske's analysis is her acceptance of a fundamental
correlation between stereotyping and rarity in an organization. If
30% of the partners at Price Waterhouse had been women, Fiske
might not have reached the same conclusions. Additionally, Fiske's
"deconstruction" of certain facially neutral comments was legally
innovative. It gave Hopkins the important opportunity to docu-
ment her claim of stereotyping beyond recounting only the obvi-
ously sexist remarks. It meant that even in cases in which there are
no "smoking gun" statements, there might still be persuasive evi-
dence of stereotyping. 1
III. THE COMPARATIVE STANDARD: IF ONLY HOPKINS WERE A MAN
The most conventional way of analyzing the legal issue in
Hopkins is to apply a comparative standard-compare Ann Hop-
kins' treatment to that of a similarly situated man. If Hopkins had
been a man, would the partners have made the same objections to
"his" personal style and would they have objected with the same
intensity? Under the comparative standard, women are measured
by the rules created with men in mind. Implicit in the comparative
standard is that if women follow men's rules, they have a right not
be disadvantaged for doing so. The comparative standard is so well
entrenched that it is sometimes treated as if it were the only con-
ceivable meaning of discrimination. The comparative standard is
also frequently linked to liberal feminism. The primary goal of lib-
eral feminism in this context is identified as affording women the
same access to jobs and other benefits as is given to men.2
AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 151 (1986). Donald Bersoff was the counsel of record for the APA
Amicus Brief in Price Waterhouse, supra note 8.
61. The remainder of Fiske's analysis was less unusual from a legal standpoint. Her
objections to the standardless subjective procedure used at Price Waterhouse for selecting
partners are familiar. Lawyers as well as social scientists have long argued that such unfet-
tered discretion facilitates discrimination. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW 191-205 (2d ed. 1983).
62. Alison Jaggar's often-cited taxonomy describes liberal feminism as one of four ma-
jor feminist theoretical approaches. A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 27-50
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There is an intricate relationship between the comparative
standard and the concept of causation in employment discrimina-
tion law. A plaintiff proves her case by showing that "but for" her
sex, she would have received the job or benefit.6 3 Sex is considered
to be the "cause" of the employer's decision if the same result
would not have occurred in the case of a man.
The precise relationship between what qualifies as discrimina-
tory behavior and which behavior "causes" harm, however, is not
always clear. Only in certain types of cases-for example, where a
person is a target of an indisputably racist or sexist epithet-will
there be a sharply delineated focus on whether the discriminatory
behavior caused the alleged harm. In these cases, the attention
shifts from the quality of the defendant's behavior (the discrimina-
tion question) to the role we ascribe to that behavior in the un-
folding of events (the causation question). More often, the issues
are analyzed in a blended fashion: we decide whether conduct is
discriminatory by reference to the comparative standard. In these
cases, the issue of causation is difficult to separate from the issue
of discrimination. What makes the conduct discriminatory is that
it would not have had the same impact on a man.
This analysis of the relationship between cause and discrimi-
natory behavior finds its analogue in tort law in the murky doc-
trine of proximate cause.6 4 Proximate cause becomes most promi-
nent as a separate issue in those instances where the defendant's
conduct was clearly negligent. The classic proximate cause case
often takes the shape of a long, twisted causal chain of events in
which a highly unexpected and catastrophic injury can be traced
back to the defendant's negligent conduct. The doctrine of proxi-
mate cause serves to limit liability. for "freak" accidents, even
though there is an undisputed factual connection to the defend-
ant's negligent conduct. In the less clear cases of negligence, how-
ever, we often have trouble deciding the negligence question with-
out simultaneously ascertaining whether proximate cause is
,"present," i.e., whether defendant's duty extended to that particu-
lar risk.6 5 When we are less confident about the unacceptability of
(1983). For additional accounts of the ingredients of liberal feminism, see generally J. DONO-
VAN, FEMINIST THEORY 1-30 (1985); R. TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW (1984). '
63. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
64. See W. P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 42-45 (5th ed. 1984).
65. My analysis of proximate cause is informed by the "duty-risk" approach first devel-
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the conduct, we reframe the question as a question of causation
and end up asking the normative question in a more neutral,
quasi-scientific, and disguised fashion.
There is another analogue to tort law in the play between dis-
crimination and causation. In both tort and employment discrimi-
nation litigation, causation is often deployed as a linguistic tool for
the defendant.6 When it is futile to argue that the behavior is ac-
ceptable, it helps to shift the focus to causation and argue that the
behavior was insignificant. Causation issues often surface in "sec-
ond generation" cases after some consensus has developed that
certain recurring kinds of discriminatory behavior can not be justi-
fied. 7 For example, when it is no longer acceptable for deci-
sionmakers to express stereotyped judgments about how certain
groups should act, defendants will try to avoid liability by distanc-
ing themselves from the sexist statements and arguing lack of cau-
sation. This was the strategy of Price Waterhouse-argue that the
sexist statements of the partners were insufficient proof that sex-
ism caused the denial of partnership.
For all the purported disagreements among the Supreme
Court Justices in Hopkins, each Justice embraced the comparative
standard, and the various opinions are consistent with the general
account of the relationship between discrimination and causation
suggested above. The Justices disagreed only on the assignment of
the burden of proof, and on the quality and quantum of evidence
necessary to make it the defendant's burden, rather than the plain-
tiff's, to show that the hypothetical man would not have fared bet-
ter. The Brennan plurality opinion is the most plaintiff oriented:
the plaintiff is required only to show that gender is a "motivating"
cause of the employment decision. 8 In their concurring opinions,
oped by legal realist scholars in the 1920's and 1930's and later adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases (pt. 1), 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 1014 (1928); id. (pt. 2), 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255 (1929). See also Malone, Ruminations
on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REV. 363 (1970);
Robertson, Reason Versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin &
Associates, Inc., 34 LA. L. REV. 1 (1973). Legal realism sought to demystify proximate cause
by uncovering the various policy considerations that lay behind causation determinations.
66. For discussions of the normative nature of many causation arguments, see M. KEL-
MAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 106-07 (1987); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-
Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
67. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d. 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (sexual abuse did not alter working
environment for female employees).
68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1787 (1989).
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Justices O'Connor and White characterized the plaintiff's burden
more stringently-the plaintiff must prove that gender was a "sub-
stantial" factor in the decision. 9 Once this initial burden was met,
however, Justices O'Connor and White would place the burden of
persuasion on the defendant to prove that it would have made the
same decision regardless of the plaintiff's gender. In contrast, the
dissenters would have kept the burden of persuasion on the plain-
tiff throughout, requiring the employee to show that the same deci-
sion would not have been made if plaintiff were a man."0
By characterizing all of the opinions as within the same com-
parative mold, I do not mean to discount the practical significance
of burden shifting as a litigation issue, particularly because the
causation question is not a matter of pure evidentiary fact. Assign-
ment of the burden of persuasion can determine the outcome of a
case. My interest here is to discuss the limitations of the compara-
tive approach, rather than to analyze the details of a doctrine
based on the comparative standard.
In Hopkins, the comparative standard did not yield a ready
answer even though the facts were not hotly disputed. The prob-
lem was that the trial judge apparently accepted Price
Waterhouse's claim that because successful male candidates were
not comparable to Hopkins, their success did not indicate dispa-
rate treatment.7 Because "personality" was at issue, the challenge
was to find a male candidate with the same personal style as Hop-
kins and then to compare his treatment to Hopkins'. Hopkins con-
tended that Price Waterhouse routinely selected male partners
who were deficient in interpersonal skills. 72 However, Price
Waterhouse successfully defended this charge by distinguishing
the two cases that Hopkins claimed were most comparable. Two
men had been selected as partners, even though the first had been
criticized for acting like a "Marine drill sergeant" 73 and the other
had been described as being "abrasive and overbearing, 7 " having a
"wise guy attitude,"7 and being "cocky. '7 6 However, Judge Gesell
69. Id. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1798 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 1809-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
71. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, and remanded, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109 S. Ct.
1775 (1989).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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thought that neither man's case was comparable to Hopkins. In-
stead, the court found that their cases were distinguishable, based
on Price Waterhouse's claim that each man possessed special skills
needed by the firm." Because of this asserted lack of comparable
partnership decisions, Judge Gesell did not regard Hopkins as an
easy case.
Hopkins illustrates that applying the comparative standard
requires a great deal of judgment and that exercising this judg-
ment has its political dimension. I regard Hopkins' examples of
male candidates as convincing comparative evidence. Gesell's dif-
ferent view makes me wonder whether he had embarked on a
search for a case on "all fours" which he was destined not to find. I
also wonder why Hopkins "skill" at landing a multimillion dollar
government contract was not special enough to make her case com-
parable to the two men with special skills. Upon reading that the
male candidate likened to a Marine drill sergeant was also praised
by a member of the Policy Board for being a "man's man,''78 my
concerns about interpreting comparative evidence were intensified.
Despite all her qualifications, Ann Hopkins could never qualify as
a man's man.
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF THE COMPARATIVE STANDARD
The difficulty Judge Gesell experienced applying the compara-
tive standard may stem from the limitations of the comparative
standard itself. The comparative standard assumes that gender is
severable from other traits of the individual. The comparative
standard asks us to perform the mental feat of taking away (or
changing) the gender of a person and then determining what would
have happened. This metamorphosis requires, however, that we ig-
nore or change an important social fact about a person that affects
not only a person's self image but also the response of others to
that person. This tends to diminish the core notion of comparabil-
ity as a useful standard. If Ann Hopkins had a twin brother who
was considered her clone, their situations might still not be compa-
rable. One salient difference in their situations would be a differ-
ence in gender. If any insight has proved to be a central theme in
much of critical feminist legal scholarship in the last decade, it is
76. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 34, at 6.
77. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1115.
78. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 34, at 6.
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that ignoring a woman's gender does not consistently lead to
equality.79 A legal doctrine that relies exclusively on the compara-
tive standard is unlikely to account fully for differences that gen-
der makes. In many cases, deciding what is equitable treatment
requires some assessment other than imagining that women are
m en .
so
One reason why the comparative method seems destined not
to detect all forms of sex discrimination is that it is not particu-
larly well-suited to unearthing unconscious sexism. It may be the
case that the partners who objected to Hopkins' personal style
were sincere when they reported that they found her overbearing
and abrasive. We will never know, however, whether a male clone
of Hopkins would have been regarded by these same partners as
assertive and self-assured. A negative quality in a woman may be
experienced as a positive quality in a man. Given the importance
of gender in our world, it would be surprising if the personalities of
men and women were not experienced in gendered ways. This
means that the partners in Price Waterhouse could well believe
that Hopkins' lawsuit is unjustified-from their perspective, they
may see equal treatment, if they can truthfully assert that they
have never voted in favor of a candidate with an "objectionable"
personality. The key unaddressed question, however, is whether
79. Patricia Cain has recently historicized this theme in contemporary feminist legal
scholarship as "Stage Two (Women Are Different From Men)." Cain, Feminist Jurispru-
dence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 199 (1989-1990). See also,
Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal Thought, 3
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1987-1988). For a discussion of the risks of ignoring difference,
see Becker, Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 201 (1988); Littleton,
Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279 (1987); Scales, Towards a Feminist
Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375 (1981). Wendy Williams argues that even liberal feminist
litigators and scholars who advocated for formal equality were not denying sex differences,
but merely emphasizing commonalities among men and women. Williams, Notes from a
First Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 103-05.
80. The mental transposition of a women's gender implicitly treats femaleness as a
problem that must be erased before we can assess the situation clearly. This move resembles
the conceptual process whereby white, middle class, straight women are held to be standard
persons in order to determine whether sex discrimination is present. This focus tends to
erase the experiences of women of color, working class women, lesbians and other, compara-
tively less privileged women because it views their lives as posing problems other than sex.
For discussions of the exclusion of race, class, and sexual orientation from feminist theory,
see E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
Cain, supra note 79; Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
1990]
Vermont Law Review
this surface equality masks underlying inequities. The underlying
inequity could be felt at either an individual or a group level. For
the individual woman who acts counter to the stereotype, personal
style may present a problem because an "unfeminine" style poses
an implicit challenge to the status quo and is likely to be re-
sisted-in a variety of subtle and not so subtle ways-by those
who experience change as threatening. As for the disparate impact
of subjective personality assessments on women as a group, I-sus-
pect that the range of personal styles that are considered accept-
able for women are narrower than those for men. I have noticed
that some men who have made their mark on the world and are
respected for their achievements seem to get away with a lot-they
can be rude and unconventional. These deviations from the norm
are excused by labeling the man an eccentric, or a character, or
even an institution. It seems to be harder for a woman to be a
legend in her own time. Several accomplished academic women I
know have reputations for being unstable, idiosyncratic, and inca-
pable of leadership. This makes me think that the limits of toler-
ance probably have a differential gender impact, even if we have
not conducted a statistical analysis to measure the degree of the
disparity.
A more fundamental challenge to the adequacy of the compar-
ative standard can be constructed from the critique of objectivity
made by feminist scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon81 and
Martha Minow.82 They have demonstrated in a number of contexts
how the prevailing viewpoint is not seen as a viewpoint at all. The
partiality of the dominant (i.e., male) perspective is obscured,
largely because it is unstated and presumed. The minority view, in
contrast, is regarded as a viewpoint, as being partial and particu-
lar, rather than objective and universal. Feminists are said to have
a perspective, while mainstream writers unselfconsciously purport
to make neutral assessments.
An illustration of the power of the hidden viewpoint can be
seen in the difficulties religious minorities face when asserting
"equal" rights to time off from work to observe their holy days.
The dominant group is generally Christian and observes Sunday as
the Sabbath. When an Orthodox Jew claims a right to Saturday
81. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); C. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
82. Minow, Supreme Court 1986 Term-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10, 34-57 (1987).
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off, for example, the claim may be thought of as seeking a special
privilege, as stemming from a particular religious point of view.
The Sunday churchgoers can mask the religious nature of their ob-
servance because they are merely taking advantage of the official
day off. It is the naturalness of the unstated viewpoint that gives it
its epistemological power. Employers will not likely feel put upon
by the religious practices of the Sunday worshippers. The Sab-
batarians, however, may well be made to feel that they have subor-
dinated their job to accommodate their personal religious beliefs.
In a workplace that is often dominated by men-both numeri-
cally and in terms of resources and privilege-the unfelt power of
implicit male norms is the backdrop against which women make
their claims to equal employment opportunity. The dynamics un-
derlying implementation of sexual harassment illustrate the point.
For women workers, it is very important that the workplace be free
from sexual harassment. The issue of sexual harassment is less im-
portant for men because they are far less likely to be victims. I
have seen this asymmetry of positions played out in the following
way. When women seek the enforcement of sexual harassment pol-
icies, for example, the position is apt to be viewed by many male
colleagues or co-workers as the woman's perspective. Even those
who agree with the merits of the position may think that the pro-
ponent of the policy has a personal axe to grind. When men in the
majority make similar self-interested arguments for policy changes,
however, they are much more readily viewed as making an argu-
ment for the good of the order. These debates can have repercus-
sions beyond the immediate issue. A reputation for lack of imparti-
ality, for example, can hurt a woman's chances for advancement.
Often the promotion goes to the person who is viewed as a moder-
ate, a team player, a person who will create consensus. In some
abstract world, an individual woman may be comparable to an in-
dividual man in her willingness to compromise or to work to find a
common ground. Her position as a minority, however, may make it
seem as if she is more narrow, self-absorbed, and biased than her
male counterpart. The comparative standard tends not to highlight
this complexity. In purporting to be a search to discover whether
discrimination caused the harm, the legal comparative standard
tacitly assumes that the collective position of men and women is
the same and, I believe, considerably underestimates the disadvan-
tage of being a woman in a man's world.
In the last analysis, how one resolves the question whether
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Hopkins would have made partner if she had been a man probably
depends as much on political starting points as it does on the spe-
cifics of the decisionmaking process at Price Waterhouse. I suspect
that persons who believe that women are treated fairly in the
workplace or that women are often given special preferences will
resist the claim that gender made the difference in this particular
decision. Those who think that discrimination against women is
commonplace will be disposed to believe that a man with similar
qualifications would have been selected as partner.
A good example of the importance of differing starting points
surfaced during the testimony of Dr. Fiske. Judge Gesell actively
questioned Fiske and kept interrupting counsel to pose his own
questions.8 3 At one point, Gesell asked Fiske whether a particular
partner's assessment of Hopkins and his behavior toward her was a
"stereotype."8' The partner had been in the meeting with Hopkins
when she cut off another woman from speaking. The following ex-
change between Fiske and Judge Gesell captures the wide distance
between them.
THE COURT: He had a group of managers in the com-
pany talking about how the job was going, women, men man-
agers, including this plaintiff. He was asking for suggestions
on how they ought to proceed. And another woman spoke up
and she was told by Miss Hopkins to keep still. It wasn't rele-
vant. So he said, look, we are all trying to work on this. You
shouldn't be so assertive. A stereotype?
THE WITNESS [Dr. Fiske]: I would suggest that the
same behavior coming from a man would be less likely to be
focused on as much as a problem.
THE COURT: Well, he probably would have fired a man.
I agree with that. If a'man had done it, he probably would fire
him but other than that I don't understand what you are
talking about.8 5
83. See, e.g., Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 26 (Judge Gesell complains to Fiske
about social science terminology: "You are not telling me anything. You have got to talk to a
layman, ma'am."); id. at 28 (Judge Gesell interrupts Fiske to ask, "Does that lady [Fiske]
have an opinion that she is going to offer in this case?"); id. at 31 (Judge Gesell interrupts
to ask Fiske to describe her research because he finds it hard to believe that men doing
business with women expect them to be "tender and suppliant and meek and courteous and
sweet.").
84. Id. at 71.
85. Id.
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Dr. Fiske thought that if a man silenced a woman by cutting
her off, it might not have been noticed, at least not to the degree
that Hopkins' actions had been. Judge Gesell appears to think that
Hopkins was lucky to be a woman because he believed that any
man who acted that way would have lost his job. There is nothing
in the record to indicate how partners at Price Waterhouse typi-
cally responded to incidents such as this. The answer to the com-
parative question boiled down to political starting points: Fiske be-
lieved that men were allowed greater leeway in personal
interactions, particularly if they acted in a traditionally masculine,
aggressive fashion. Gesell's comment indicates that he thinks that
women are given special privileges to misbehave in the workplace,
perhaps because employers are afraid of sex discrimination
lawsuits.
V. BEYOND COMPARISONS: A FEMINIST READING OF PRICE
WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS
Posing the comparative question of whether Ann Hopkins
would have been chosen to be a partner if she had been a man is
likely to result in a stalemate. It frames the issue of discrimination
abstractly and uncritically assumes that differences in people exist
apart from the social environment in which they work and interact.
The comparative question presupposes that a judge can discover
whether there are salient differences about the person being
judged-besides a difference in gender-that might justify treating
her unfavorably. The question is framed simply as a question of
fact. The question of difference becomes more complicated, how-
ever, if we start from an assumption that differences can be so-
cially constructed and that dominant culture is marked by a
profound gender imbalance in power, numbers, and ability to af-
fect the working environment. The question of difference shifts
from the factual inquiry about whether a difference exists (Was
Hopkins really more outrageous than her male peers?) to an in-
quiry into the ways in which a perception of difference originates
and is maintained.
A feminist reading of Hopkins8" leads me beyond comparisons
86. Feminist legal scholars have focused attention on the importance of language and
the limitations that male-centered legal language imposes on feminist critics. See, e.g., Fin-
ley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 886 (1989). Feminist legal critiques now often include
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and a male-focused legal doctrine centering on objective causation.
In my reading of the opinions of Judge Gesell in the district court
and Judge Williams in the appellate court, I sense a skepticism
and at times a hostility toward claims of professional women such
as Ann Hopkins who challenge informal mechanisms used to con-
tain power in large organizations. This ideological resistance was
most dramatically expressed through criticism of Susan Fiske.
When I read the transcript of Dr. Fiske's trial testimony, I
found myself paying as much attention to the tension I discerned
between Judge Gesell and Dr. Fiske as I did to the information on
stereotyping that Fiske was conveying. Gesell seemed to have great
difficulty understanding what Fiske was saying. He interrupted her
frequently and at times he undermined her position by changing
the meaning of her statements and then challenging her to explain
herself more clearly. Although Gesell ruled in favor of Hopkins and
decried the climate at Price Waterhouse that allowed stereotyping
to occur, some of his statements during trial and portions of his
written opinion suggest that he did not fully appreciate the sub-
stance of Fiske's testimony. Gesell's opinion is problematic, even
though he found that Price Waterhouse had discriminated and ac-
cepted Hopkins' theory of stereotyping as a form of discrimination.
There is no such ambivalence in the views expressed by Judge
Williams on the appellate court and cited approvingly by Justice
Kennedy." Williams and Kennedy clearly bought into Price
Waterhouse's strategy to discredit Fiske's testimony by relying on
sex-biased images and stereotypes. The critique that Fiske leveled
at the partners' evaluation of Hopkins' personality could be ap-
plied to these judicial assessments of Dr. Fiske. In this respect, the
Hopkins litigation was itself a demonstration of the influence of
sex-biased assumptions and gendered thinking in the decisionmak-
ing processes of male-dominated institutions.8
discussions of how judicial language contributes to the marginalization of women. Chamallas
& Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990);
Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L.
REV. 1065 (1985); Phinney, Feminism, Epistemology and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading
Bowen v. Gilliard, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 151 (1989).
87. See supra note 10.
88. Two of the opinions written in the Hopkins litigation-by Judge Joyce Hens Green
sitting by designation on the D.C. Circuit, and Justice Brennan of the Supreme Court-were
progressive in both result and rhetoric. Green's opinion was the only one to mention that
Hopkins had faced sex-linked barriers in her career before the denial of partnership at Price
Waterhouse. Hopkins and her former husband first worked for Touche Ross. Hopkins left
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A. The Trouble with Judge Gesell
Although Judge Gesell referred to Dr. Fiske as "well quali-
fied"89 and noted that she had done "extensive research and study
in the field of stereotyping,"90 I am not confident that he under-
stood some of the basic assumptions underlying her research. As I
read Fiske, her analysis is predicated on the disparate power of
dominant and nondominant groups in a given organizational set-
ting." Fiske believed that, as a token woman, Ann Hopkins was
vulnerable to sex stereotyping-a social practice that affects per-
ceptions and knowledge acquisition and has little or nothing to do
with biological differences between the sexes. Fiske's investigation
was not centered on individuals, nor was it fashioned to assess in-
dividual blame. Fiske declined to identify particular partners as
being stereotypers, explaining that her objective was to address the
question whether stereotyping was occurring at the institutional
level within an organization.2
Much of the difficulty Gesell experienced understanding Fiske
during her testimony stemmed from his effort to fit her remarks
into a narrower legalistic mode which focuses on individual blame-
worthiness. He may have not fully appreciated her points because
he was interested in pinpointing the partner or partners who were
Touche Ross because of its anti-spouse policy that prohibited both a husband and wife from
being considered for partnership. When Hopkins was hired at Price Waterhouse, the firm
waived its rule against hiring a manager whose spouse was a partner in another firm. Price
Waterhouse then took the position that Hopkins could not be considered for partnership
because her husband was a partner for a competing firm. Hopkins was nominated for part-
nership only after she threatened to resign and her husband left Touche Ross. Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109 S. Ct.
1775 (1989).
89. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, and remanded, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109 S. Ct.
1175 (1989).
90. Id.
91. For Fiske, this disparity is expressed primarily as a function of numbers. Although
she had no occasion to address the question of sexism in predominantly female contexts, the
implication is that a workplace will change when there is a greater gender balance among
the decisionmakers. In this respect, Fiske's analysis is incomplete. She does not take into
account pressures beyond the specific organization that may prompt women decisionmakers
to perpetuate male-focused norms. Nor does she analyze the firmly embedded conceptual
and linguistic structures that make it difficult for even consciously feminist men and women
to break out of gendered patterns. Fiske's emphasis on numbers, however, was not naive.
Fiske acknowledged that even large percentages of women workers in low power positions do
not affect stereotyping of women in higher level positions nor enhance the power of the low
status female jobs. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 47.
92. Id. at 34, 45.
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guilty of stereotyping, even if they were unaware of their own bias.
Gesell had trouble, for example, understanding the way Fiske
used the key terms "token" and "stereotype." When Fiske ex-
plained that solo or token women were likely to be perceived in
female stereotypical roles, Gesell initially jumped to the conclusion
that Fiske was condemning the partnership for employing Hopkins
solely because she was a woman:
THE COURT: Then you are viewing this as a token case,
somebody put a women in just because they want a woman,
as they put a black or a homosexual or any of these different
groups. Just put them in there so you would recognize them.
THE WITNESS (Dr. Fiske): I don't actually mean to im-
ply that when I say token, the terminology in my field is to
call somebody who is rare or unusual a token, but obviously
that implies that they are there for token reasons.
THE COURT: Well, token has a very bad connotation in
the field that I am working in, has an extraordinarily bad
connotation."
This exchange indicates that Gesell initially thought Fiske was
making a normative assessment about the motivation of the part-
ners at Price Waterhouse, when in fact Fiske was only trying to
make a descriptive point about organizational demographics. This
confusion apparently was cleared up after Fiske repeated her defi-
nition of "token." However, Gesell then experienced conceptually
similar problems understanding what Fiske meant by "stereotype."
Gesell repeatedly misused the terminology-he mistakenly thought
that "stereotype" referred to the person doing the stereotyping, in-
stead of referring to a conceptual frame that shapes perceptions
and knowledge. His focus was on the male partner making the
judgment, rather than on the conceptual and linguistic mecha-
nisms that might shape those judgments:
THE COURT: Well, let me put this to you and see if I can
understand-I am trying to understand this. I take it a per-
son who is stereo-subject to this stereotype flaw doesn't
know it himself. It isn't conscious.
THE WITNESS (Dr. Fiske): You mean the stereotyper?
THE COURT: The person stereotyped, the male.
93. Id. at 31-32.
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THE WITNESS (Dr. Fiske): Okay, the person who is
stereotyping?
THE COURT: I don't know what you call it, but the person
you say is the stereotype, he doesn't intentionally know he is,
does he?94
Gesell's misunderstanding of the "stereotype" concept per-
sisted throughout Fiske's testimony. In Gesell's parlance, individ-
ual partners became the "stereotype" and he analogized stereotyp-
ing to a kind of disease or malady. He wondered, for example,
whether the senior partner in Hopkins' department who offered
her the critical advice to act more femininely had suddenly been
bitten by the "stereotype bug." '95 Finding out whether there was
something wrong with individual partners was important to Gesell.
Gesell appeared not to appreciate the fact that Fiske did not re-
gard stereotyping as a pathology that occurred only in infected
workplaces. The radical potential of Fiske's research-its potential
to provide a critique of most male-dominated workplaces-was ob-
scured by Gesell's rhetoric of individual blame and contagion.
The best example of Gesell's failure to grasp the significance
of Fiske's organizational theory of stereotyping and the implica-
tions it carries for legal doctrine occurred when Fiske tried to offer
a solution to the "double bind." Fiske had previously testified that
women who act according to feminine stereotypes run the risk of
being viewed as incompetent.9 6 Fiske also claimed that counter-
stereotypic behavior was risky because aggressive women might be
said to lack social skills.9 7 As one possible solution to the dilemma
of the double bind, Fiske said she would advise women "to work in
a department that has a substantial number of women in it."98
Judge Gesell objected to such advice, claiming that Fiske's solution
would mean "that I would have many more lawsuits because every
woman that had that happen to her would say it was sexual
bias."99 Gesell apparently thought that Fiske was arguing in favor
of having employers segregate existing women employees into sep-
arate departments. Rather, Fiske was arguing for increased hiring
and promotion of women in higher echelon jobs, an argument
94. Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 42, 46.
96. Id. at 46.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 64.
99. Id. at 48.
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designed to encourage employers to go beyond token representa-
tion. For Fiske, "batch hiring" and "batch promotion" was one
way to secure a critical mass of women and simultaneously to de-
crease the likelihood of stereotyping in an organization.'" 0 Such a
forward-looking structural solution did not fit comfortably into Ge-
sell's framework or the framework of Title VII as he understood it.
This analysis of Gesell's interaction with Fiske as a witness is
not meant to suggest that her testimony had no positive influence
on Gesell's decision. Indeed, because Gesell concluded that the
comparative standard had not been violated, 101 his ruling for Hop-
kins was based on his finding that Price Waterhouse failed to ad-
dress the problem of stereotyping in the firm.102 However, even his
rather strongly worded opinion faulting the employer for not tak-
ing preventive measures displays, I believe, a different and less
progressive understanding of the concept of stereotyping than
what Fiske embraced. Gesell was caught up in the search for the
"stereotype," by which I believe he meant a male chauvinist who
objected to women's advancement within the firm. Also, certain
passages in the opinion have an apologetic tone that can be read to
provide an excuse for individual partners who make unjustified de-
cisions harmful to women's advancement.
Gesell repeatedly stressed that the stereotyping by various
partners at Price Waterhouse was "unconscious."'01 3 What was in-
volved, according to Gesell, was not "an intentional discriminatory
motive or purpose,"'0 4 but a "far more subtle process [where] one
100. Id.
101. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1115-16 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, and remanded; 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 109
S. Ct. 1175 (1989).
102. Id. at 1120. Gesell relied on an article by Nadine Taub who, nearly a decade
before, had advocated the recognition of stereotyping as a per se violation of Title VII with-
out further proof of discriminatory intent. Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stere-
otyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. RFv. 345 (1980). Ge-
sell's initial ruling, however, was not particularly financially rewarding to Hopkins. Because
he refused to find that Hopkins had been constructively discharged, he awarded no backpay.
Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1121. On remand from the Supreme Court, Gesell changed his
decision and ruled that Hopkins had been constructively discharged, thus making her enti-
tled to back pay, as well as the right to be made partner. Even this victory was not com-
plete, however. Gesell lowered the amount of back pay owed Hopkins, claiming that she had
failed to mitigate her damages. "Vindication dominated her thinking and kept her earnings
below what she could have earned by reasonable effort in her field." Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1214 (D.D.C. 1990).
103. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1118.
104. Id.
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who is in a distinct minority may be viewed differently by the ma-
jority because the individual deviates from an artificial standard-
ized profile."'1 5 This lack of "intentional" sexual stereotyping
meant that Hopkins could not meet her burden as to discrimina-
tory motive or purpose because such a specific showing of intent
was required in this case."0 It is not entirely clear, however, why
Gesell did not regard explicitly gendered comments such as the
statement that Hopkins "overcompensated for being a woman"'17
or should act and dress "more femininely"'1 8 as instances of bla-
tant, intentional stereotyping. His opinion suggests that no matter
how clearly the comment matched the familiar stereotype about
the targeted group, it would not amount to intentional sex stere-
otyping unless the commenter consciously desired to inflict harm
on the target because she was a woman. Under this narrow view,
even statements that embodied explicitly gendered language, relied
on confining sex-linked roles and images, and served to put women
in their place could be classified as "subtle" discrimination, pro-
vided there was no disclosure by the speaker of the hostile motiva-
tion underlying his remarks.
Other passages in Gesell's opinion suggest that he did not
share Fiske's view that stereotyping is a socially-constructed mech-
anism by which minorities are marginalized in the workplace. At
points, Gesell's rhetoric takes on a biologic cast. Gesell stated that
the observation that "deep within males and females there exist
sexually based reactions to the personal characteristics of one of
the opposite sex surely comes as no surprise. ' 9 The sexual reac-
tion to which Gesell refers differs from the phenomenon of stere-
otyping as Fiske described it. For Fiske, stereotyping is a one-way
street. The token group is subjected to confining images because
they do not possess the power or the numbers to affect the culture
of the dominant group. For Gesell, sexual difference, rather than
dominance or minority status, causes men and women to view the
other group as "the other." Although Gesell does not explicitly
state that this sexual difference has its origin in biology, his loca-
tion of the reaction as "deep within" evokes images of biological,
heterosexual responses.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 25.
108. See supra text accompanying note 28.
109. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. at 1117.
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Although Gesell held Price Waterhouse liable for discriminat-
ing against Ann Hopkins, parts of his opinion reinforce a conserva-
tive view, a view that justifies inequality in the workplace as being
consistent with women's biological nature. Gesell noted that
"[b]usiness women who earn a place at the highest ranks of their
profession by combining ability with a strong persistent effort to
succeed frequently sense antagonism from some male colleagues
whose contact with the working female as an equal has been lim-
ited."1 ' This statement signals an apologetic attitude: Gesell
seems to excuse men because they have not had enough exposure
to the monolithic creature he calls the working female. The state-
ment also hints that the problem lies in the minds of women who
"sense" the negative reaction toward them. The implication is that
if such women were not so sensitive, the problem would decrease
or disappear. Finally, Gesell makes it clear that he does not want
his ruling to become a catalyst for transforming gender relations in
the workplace.
[C]onsidering the infinite variety of work conditions; differ-
ences in experience, education and perceptions among indi-
viduals in working encounters; as well as the fact that the in-
teractions of personalities of either sex are as complex and
inscrutable and as infinite as combinations of genes will pro-
duce, it is impossible to accept the view that Congress in-
tended to have courts police every instance where subjective
judgment many be tainted by unarticulated, unconscious as-
sumptions related to sex."'
The statement sounds a conservative note on two levels. On the
surface, it assures that enforcement of Title VII will not bring rad-
ical change. The statement also links sex and sexual difference to
"genes" and rhetorically justifies nonintervention by making us
think that sex differences are at once "inscrutable" and inalterable.
The trouble with Judge Gesell's opinion is that in borrowing
Fiske's theory of stereotyping, he did not accept her structurally-
based explanation of difference. Gesell underestimates and detoxi-
fies the harm of sexual domination of women in the workplace by
linking sexual stereotyping to inherent biological difference.
110. Id. at 1118.
111. Id.
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B. The Case Against Susan Fiske
At the appellate level, Judge Williams' dissenting opinion de-
ploys sexual difference in an aggressive fashion against both Ann
Hopkins and Susan Fiske. 1 Although Williams never specifies its
origin, the. "fact" of sexual difference is critical to the conceptual
and linguistic structure of his argument. It is used simultaneously
to justify sexual stereotyping at Price Waterhouse and to discredit
Fiske's testimony. Williams not only believed that Hopkins was
treated fairly and should lose; he feared that listening to Fiske
would victimize men and result in an intolerable incursion into
their freedom of thought and speech. There is an irony to Wil-
liams' intense negative reaction to Fiske. As a token female expert
and academic, Fiske was vulnerable to marginalization and stere-
otyping. In tune with the Price Waterhouse litigation strategy,
Williams portrayed Fiske as unscientific, biased, and irrelevant.' 13
He also thought her views were dangerous, stating that "[i]f analy-
sis [such as Fiske's] is to prevail in federal courts, no employer can
base any adverse action as to a woman on such attributes" as being
overbearing, arrogant, and abrasive.""
At the outset, Williams framed the issue as one of sexual dif-
ference. He quoted from Ballard v. United States,"5 a case chal-
* lenging the exclusion of women from jury service, in which Justice
Douglas had remarked that "the two sexes are not fungible.""' In
Ballard, Douglas sought to use sexual difference progressively by
making an argument for the sexual integration of juries." 7 Wil-
liams' use of sexual difference, however, is conservative, implying
that some sexual stereotyping is permissible when it reflects differ-
ences between men and women." 8
To prove that some stereotyping was permissible, Williams of-
112. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams,
J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 477-78. I am reminded of the partners' harsh assessment of Ann Hop-
kins when I read Williams' critique of Susan Fiske. See supra text accompanying notes 21-
28.
114. Id. at 477.
115. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
116. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J., dissenting) (quoting Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
117. See Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-96.
118. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 478 (Williams, J., dissenting). "The stereotype theory
adopted by the district court should not be allowed to spring to life in a case where its
occurrence is not plausibly related to [an employment decision regarding the plaintiff]." Id.
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fered the example of a man who appeared for work in skirts and
dresses. He claimed that firing the man for failing to conform to
the sexual stereotype that prohibits men from wearing women's
clothing would not give rise to liability under Title VII. 1 9 Judge
Bootle had paraded the same "horrible" in an early case when the
issue was whether men could be fired from their jobs for having
long hair.120 For these judges, allowing a man to wear a dress repre-
sents the absurd extreme to which a literal reading of Title VII
might lead.
The example of a man in a dress is not just an example of a
gender taboo that is strictly enforced. Cross-dressing is commonly
misassociated with homosexuality and is regarded as a form of sex-
ual deviance. 121 Williams' use of the cross-dressing image is a sig-
nal that sex differences are biological, and that ignoring sex differ-
ences is risky and unnatural. The cross-dressing image also serves
to underscore the heterosexism of the law that remains virtually
untouched by Title VII doctrine.'22 Williams' dissent artfully
draws on the tension between the law's failure to protect against
discrimination based on sexual orientation and the promise of Ti-
tle VII to root out sexual stereotyping. This serves further to sexu-
alize Hopkins' claim, even though Williams says nothing directly
about Hopkins' sexuality. Williams' opinion subtly brings the
reader into the private realm of heterosexual relations where male
dominance is most pronounced and resistant to challenge.
After criticizing the district court for failing to "draw a line
between permissible and impermissible'' 1 3 stereotyping, Williams
set out to deny-comment by comment-that the gendered re-
marks made by the partners at Price Waterhouse were either
harmful or true sex stereotypes after all. He regarded the advice to
act "more femininely"' 24 as harmless because it came from a sup-
119. Id.
120. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018, 1020 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
For a feminist analysis of dress restrictions, see Note, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation:
A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 109 (1982).
121. For a discussion of many of the common misperceptions about cross-dressers, see
J. WEINRICH, SEXUAL LANDSCAPES 24-26 (1987).
122. See De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (Title VII does
not recognize claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation). See also EDITORS OF THE
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 68-71 (1990).
123. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J., dissenting).
124. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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porter and was not formally endorsed by the Policy Board.1"5 The
charm school remark, he admitted, was sex-linked, but Williams
discounted its significance by calling it "facetious" 126 and by joking
that "[t]he smoke from this gun seems to me rather wispy. '12 7 He
sought to de-sex the phrase "one of the boys"12 8 by arguing that
some sex-linked phrases lose any genuine link to gender with the
passage of time.1 29 The only remark that Williams thought was
"plainly beyond the pale' 13 0 was the admission. by the partner who
said he "could not consider any woman seriously as a partnership
candidate.'' s3 Because this remark had not been made in connec-
tion with Hopkins' case, Williams found it irrelevant.'3 2
Williams' operational definition of impermissible stereotyping
was exceedingly narrow-only a direct confession of discrimination
qualified as possibly illegal. His hostility to Hopkins' claim is even
more dramatically evidenced by his aggressive, masculinist rheto-
ric. Williams sounds positively indignant when he describes the
partner who would not take women seriously as a "male chauvinist
pig"'3 3 and a "troglodyte."'3 4 Williams' aggressive stance, however,
did not help Hopkins prove her case because Williams also insisted
that there was no showing that this misbehaving partner had ever
influenced anyone else. He also speculated that the informal atmo-
sphere of the firm made these remarks unacceptable, even though
the record was clear that the partner had never been
reprimanded.' 3
125. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 475 (Williams, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 476.
129. Id. Williams argued that not all sex-based phrases were sexist. He cited as an ex-
ample the contemporary use of the term "doll" to describe either a man or a woman who is
pleasant or generous. See id. Williams observed that "doll" originally was slang for a "con-
ventionally pretty and shapely woman .... whose function is to elevate the status of the
male and to inspire male lust." Id. (citing NEW DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG 108 (1986)).
There is a double meaning in Williams' text. On the surface he makes a persuasive argu-
ment that words must be analyzed in historical and textual context. However, Williams'
citation of the original meaning of "doll" reinforces sexist images because the definition
objectifies woman and treats women as instruments to be used either for male sexual gratifi-
cation or for male moral development. By so inserting this view of woman as sex object into
his text, Williams indirectly offers a justification for differential treatment based on sex.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. Williams' tough talk signals a willingness to use power, particularly because it
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Williams' attack of Fiske was similarly aggressive in tone. He
not only questioned Fiske's conclusion that stereotyping had in-
fected the decisionmaking process at Price Waterhouse, he also
questioned her qualifications, expertise, and objectivity. 3 ' The
opinion is so laden with sexual stereotypes that it reinforces
Fiske's point about the association between intensity of negative
reaction and token status. Williams describes Fiske in highly skep-
tical terms as a witness "purporting to be an expert in the field.'
3 7
None of the usual bases for challenging Fiske as an expert were
present in the case. Price Waterhouse had not questioned her ex-
pertise or the legitimacy of her discipline. In its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court, the American Psychological Association demon-
strated that Fiske's methods and research had become standard
fare within the discipline."3 ' Williams also trivialized Fiske's
method of detecting sexual stereotyping from explicitly gendered
comments by claiming that "anyone could do so."" Relying on his
own judgment, with some aid from the New Dictionary of Ameri-
can Slang,'4 ° Williams authoritatively stated that some sex-based
phrases "have gradually detached themselves from any genuine
link to sex."',
Williams strongly objected to Fiske's willingness to make an
assessment of the situation at Price Waterhouse without her per-
sonally meeting with the partners or Hopkins and finding out
"about the truth of the matters." '42 However, the fact that Hop-
kins-and others in her field-worked from a written record alone
cannot account fully for Williams' objections. Williams also por-
trayed Fiske as unscientific: he said her "arts"'4 allowed her to
detect the existence of stereotyping and he characterized her pro-
is injudicious (and not very nice) to call a person names. Williams' macho reaction is famil-
iar to me. In numerous task forces, committees, and other administrative settings, I have
heard not-so-feminist men self-righteously denounce sexual harassment and sexism with no
apparent qualms. Often there are promises to fire or otherwise deal swiftly and harshly with
any man who dares to defy the new policy. The problem for women typically occurs when
the denouncers are simply not willing in specific cases to find the evidence compelling
enough to label it harassment or sexism. Because the aggressive display is not actually used
to change the marginal status of women, it serves only to underline male power.
136. Id. at 477-78.
137. Id. at 477.
138. APA Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 29.
139. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 477 (Williams, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 129.
141. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 477.
143. Id.
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fessional judgment as "remarkable intuitions. 14 4 This critique
sought to discredit Fiske by transforming her credentials as a so-
cial scientist into a womanly art and by devaluing her methodology
by labeling it women's intuition. It is clear that Williams placed
little value on female-identified traits in this context. His gendered
criticism of Fiske was not unlike a host of similar slams from Price
Waterhouse counsel who described Fiske's testimony as "gossamer
evidence"'14 5 and "intuitive hunches."'" 6 Neither Williams nor
Price Waterhouse ever set forth reasons explaining why they
thought that Fiske's qualitative research methods were deficient. It
was enough to make the rhetorical link between woman/intuition/
art-the implicit contrast being man/research/science. The effect
was to discredit Fiske by the invocation of gender stereotypes.
In addition to undermining the soundness of Fiske's judgment,
Williams also questioned her ability to judge fairly in any case in-
volving a woman. Williams asserted that Fiske would reach the
same conclusion whenever a woman's personality was criticized, no
matter how justified the criticism might be.
[I]f an observer characterized someone as 'overbearing and
arrogant and abrasive and running over people,' an expert
such as Dr. Fiske could discern-and would, if the subject
were a woman-that they stemmed from unconscious stereo-
types.... To an expert of Dr. Fiske's qualifications, it seems
plain that no woman could be overbearing, arrogant or abra-
sive: any observations to that effect would necessarily be dis-
counted as the product of stereotyping. If analysis like this is
to prevail in federal courts, no employer can base any adverse
action as to a woman on such attributes. 147
Justice Kennedy echoed this criticism in his dissent in the Su-
preme Court."" He quoted the above passage and added the un-
qualified statement that "[t]he plaintiff who engages Dr. Susan
Fiske should have no trouble showing that sex discrimination
played a part in any decision."" 9
On a number of levels, this criticism of Fiske is unfair. Fiske
did not rest her conclusion on just one factor-the excessively
144. Id. at 478.
145. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 34, at 20.
146. Id. at 44.
147. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 477 (Williams, J., dissenting).
148. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
149. Id. at 1813 n.5 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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strong objection on the part of some partners to Hopkins' counter-
stereotypic behavior. She also placed weight on the rarity of
women as partners and partnership candidates, the highly subjec-
tive nature of the process, the positive reaction of Hopkins' clients,
and Hopkins' clear ability to make money for the firm and work
long hours. Given this combination of factors, Fiske might have
thought (as I do) that Hopkins was an easy case. Her conclusion in
Hopkins does not tell us how Fiske might come out in a case where
the woman was not so clearly a star in the firm. Hopkins was the
only case in which Fiske had ever appeared as an expert witness.1 50
Williams' inclination to doubt Fiske's ability to be impartial is
also sex-linked. Part of the gender script that sharply dichotomizes
the traits of men and women links femaleness with partiality, while
ascribing universality and objectivity to men. This dichotomy fails
to account for the partiality of the dominant culture and it masks
the hidden male viewpoint. The woman's point of view is seen as a
perspective, while the male point of view is so deeply embedded in
the structure that it is not regarded as a point of view at all, but
simply as the "truth of the matter." Williams did not understand,
or was not impressed by, the starting point of Fiske's analy-
sis-that Ann Hopkins was a token woman in an intensively male-
dominated firm. By overlooking the fact of women's marginaliza-
tion in the workplace, Williams missed the point of much of
Fiske's structural analysis. As Kanter puts it, in the terms of Ge-
stalt psychology, Williams failed to see that "those who get to be
common more easily become 'ground' rather than 'figure.' "15
Finally, Williams believed that accepting Fiske and her theory
of stereotyping posed the danger of turning "Title VII from a pro-
hibition of discriminatory conduct into an engine for rooting out
sexist thoughts." 52 He stated that the case "necessitate[s] a study
of just what expressions Congress may have wished to wash from
the American tongue' 1 53 and claimed that the evidence in Hopkins
"establishe[d] at most the existence of sexist attitudes.' 15" His
rhetoric closely tracks Judge Easterbrook's labeling of the anti-
pornography ordinance co-authored by Catharine MacKinnon and
150. Trial Testimony, supra note 35, at 24.
151. R. KANTER, supra note 41, at 210.
152. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 477 (Williams, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 478.
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Andrea Dworkin' 55 as "thought control.'"5 This McCarthyesque
language conjures up images of witchhunts, social engineers, and
threats to individual liberty and free speech. The victim in this
conservative narrative is not Ann Hopkins, but the partners who
spoke against her. In this way, enforcement of anti-discrimination
law was transformed by Williams' rhetoric into an incursion on
free speech.1 57 The rhetorical shift from discrimination to free
speech enabled Williams to project Hopkins as a danger. Hopkins'
claim for partnership was cast as posing a threat to the freedom of
thought of the partners. Eclipsed by this account are the substan-
tial financial benefits conferred by Hopkins' work for the firm and
the other positive aspects of her employment. This accentuation of
the negative resembles the process Fiske described by which a wo-
man who fails to conform to familiar feminine roles is often type-
cast as the iron maiden,"5 8 as posing a danger in excess of her indi-
vidual influence and power.
Williams' rejection of Hopkins' claim and his resistance to
Fiske's theory of stereotyping was embedded in gendered stereo-
types, images, and language. He embraced a notion of sexual dif-
ference but not sexual domination. Williams' opinion suggests that
he believes that men and women are different, but that such differ-
ences are not tied to structural inequities. Moreover, in pronounc-
ing on matters of sexual difference, Williams spoke authoritatively
and aggressively. His opinion left no space to listen to "experts"
such as Fiske whose starting points tended to question, rather than
to reinforce, male domination in the workplace.
CONCLUSION
Justice Brennan cautioned that it was not the Court's job to
decide whether Hopkins was "nice" but only whether the partners
reacted negatively to her because she was a woman.'59 My reading
of Hopkins suggests that these two questions are intertwined. Be-
cause I accept the proposition that sexual difference is socially con-
155. For a comprehensive draft of the anti-pornography ordinance, see W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAMISAR, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 760 (6th ed. 1986).
156. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
157. Cf. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
159. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795 (1989).
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structed, I regard even common judgments about niceness as prob-
lematic. For me, Ann Hopkins presented an easy case. It is easy
because Hopkins was able so convincingly to document her posi-
tive value to the firm and the commitment she made to that organ-
ization. It is easy because I share Fiske's assessment that it is not
possible to separate criticism of Hopkins' personal style from Hop-
kins' status as a token woman at Price Waterhouse. It is easy be-
cause I doubt whether it is possible to make an objective assess-
ment about Hopkins' personality retrospectively, given the male-
focused culture at Price Waterhouse. It is easy because I conclude
from my experience as a token woman in the legal academy 6 ' that
if there are no strong legal incentives to encourage employers to
retain and advance women in their jobs, then prevailing structural,
conceptual, and linguistic frameworks will continue to provide
powerful justifications for women's exclusion and unfavorable
treatment.
160. Despite a significant rise in the percentage of women law students, women still
comprise only approximately 20% of the full-time faculty at ABA accredited schools. Angel,
Women in Legal Education: What It's Like to Be Part of A Perpetual First Wave or the
Case of Disappearing Women, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 799, 840 (1988); Chused, The Hiring and
Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
537, 538 (1988).
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